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Abstract 
The position of women and the operation of justice were both 
contentious issues in colonial Africa. However, when combined in the 
discussion and sentencing of African women charged with murder 
and facing the death penalty for their crimes, a relatively coherent 
gendered discourse emerged: African women were frequently 
regarded as lacking the emotional and mental development to render 
them fully responsible for their actions before the law, and 
consequently liable for the death penalty. What challenged this 
benevolent, patriarchal discourse were the actions and responses of 
the women themselves, transgressing supposed gender stereotypes 
and social hierarchies in their use of lethal violence. This article 
attempts to analyze violent African female crime in Africa through the 
medium of High Court murder trials in Kenya and Nyasaland, 
focusing on both colonial judges’ perceptions of women as 
perpetrators of violent crime and on women’s responses and 
perceptions of their own criminality. Contrary to much existing 
feminist criminology, this paper will argue that women were not just 
reluctant killers; they could also be violent in their own right and for 
their own self-interest. 
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I would recommend her to mercy, as I do not consider that the mind 
of the female native is sufficiently developed to justify the application 
of the extreme penalty of the law.1 
 
African women accused of murder and standing trial in a colonial court 
were caught between the lethal machinery of colonial justice, and local, 
African interpretations of their crimes. Their crimes situated them at the 
apex of the colonial state’s struggles to control the behavior of its African 
subjects, as well as of African communities’ attempts to exert authority over 
women. However, as the articles in this edition show, neither “gender,” nor 
“colonialism” itself, were homogenous, uncontested binary categories. 
Conflicts within the colonial legal system interacted with female agency in 
contesting gender constructs to shape the trial and sentencing of violent 
female African criminals, and determine whether or not they went to the 
gallows for their fatal violence.  
To date there has been relatively little research into violent female 
criminality in Africa and the impact this had upon gender construction, 
particularly during the colonial era. This article investigates the experiences 
of violent African female offenders in the colonial judicial system in 
Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Kenya through the medium of High Court 
murder trials, with focus being given to both colonial judge’s perceptions of 
women as perpetrators of violent crime, and on the women’s responses and 
perceptions of their own criminality. Homicide is a social relationship; the 
situations which predispose women towards committing acts of violence 
must be studied as much as violent women’s individual characteristics. No-
one can ever claim to know the reality of these women’s lives, but 
employing a broadly epistemological standpoint, influenced by feminist 
criminology, assessments of women’s material and social realities can be 
made which move beyond traditional conceptions of female criminals as 
“mad” or “bad” (Smart, 1976; Heidensohn, 1985; Morris, 1987). We need to 
look at structural categories of gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality to 
understand the lives of these women, as well as the gendered social 
processes of domestic violence, motherhood, domesticity, and respectability 
which contribute to them, particularly in the colonial context where rapidly 
changing social conditions created fractures and discordances in colonial 
                                                 
1 R v Alikutu, 1926, J5/12/23, National Archives of Malawi, Zomba [hereafter NAM]. 
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discourses relating to both punishment of crime and women. What was 
known about female defendants as individual women played a considerable 
role in determining how their crimes were perceived and constructed. 
Problematically, in colonial Africa, this was often very little, giving counsel 
and the courts wide scope for interpretation, a flexibility which could work 
to both the advantage and detriment of the accused woman. The dramas of 
women and the death penalty were played out on many levels: that of the 
individual, the family, local communities, and the colonial state, and it was 
the relationship between these which determined the accused woman’s fate. 
By looking at women charged with spousal murder, child killing, the 
murder of other women, and criminal insanity, this relationship can 
highlight the changing perceptions of gender and violence in colonial 
Africa.  
 
Judgments and Justice: Colonial Courts and Capital Trials 
Legal proceedings relating to murder in Nyasaland and Kenya were largely 
based upon English precedents. Statute law applied to homicide only 
substantially differed in having a wider definition of “provocation” under 
which a charge could be reduced to manslaughter – a rare example of racial 
inequality before the law which benefited the African. Judges sat with three 
or four assessors, usually headmen or chiefs, and occasionally a European 
official, settler or missionary. These assessors were to use their local 
knowledge to advise the Judge in his decision, but he was in no way bound 
to follow their advice.  
A murder conviction in Kenya and Nyasaland, as in Britain at the 
time, carried a mandatory death sentence, for males and females, unless the 
offender was under eighteen years old, or pregnant. The right of appeal 
existed but the last hope of escaping the gallows lay in the Governor’s royal 
prerogative of mercy to commute capital sentences, a power which in Africa 
was frequently exercised. Chief Justice Jackson, discussing the death penalty 
in Nyasaland with Attorney-General Belcher and Governor Smith in 1920 
asserted that this was due to the judicial beliefs that “the comparative 
instability of the native mind and the natural tendency of primitive peoples 
towards violence” and other supposedly “tribal and racial characteristics” 
were proper factors in determining sentence.2 It is clear that many colonial 
                                                 
2 R v Matthew, 8 December 1920, J/5/12/16, NAM.  
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officials and judges were loath to employ capital punishment widely, 
whether from personal antipathy to the penalty or from a paternalistic, 
racialised attitude towards Africans. But it is still significant that between 
1903-1947 in Nyasaland there is only one record of a woman being 
executed. To place this in perspective, during the same period in Nyasaland, 
215 men were executed in some 900 capital trials, and in England and Wales 
between 1900-50 120 women were sentenced to death, with twelve being 
executed (Gowers Commission, 1953: 289-301). During this period some 
twenty-seven women in Nyasaland were brought to trial on murder 
charges, but of these, only sixteen were convicted of murder. Of these, 
twelve had their sentences commuted to imprisonment for terms of between 
two months and ten years, three women were sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and one was executed. In Kenya, records show that forty-one 
women faced capital charges in the Supreme Court - not including those 
accused of Mau Mau offences under the Emergency Assizes - of which one 
was executed, and twenty-two had their sentences commuted to 
imprisonment, with two found guilty but insane.  
 
White Men and Black Women: Colonial Judge’s Attitudes Towards 
Violent Female Offenders 
Colonial judges’ interpretations of violent African female criminality were 
most frequently marked by a paternalistic, sometimes benevolent attitude; 
what is described in the literature as a “chivalry of mercy” (Rapaport, 1991: 
368). Judges often sought to diminish these women’s moral responsibility 
for their crimes and to deny the rational nature of their acts. Constructions 
of female deviance developing in the late 1920s saw women as 
feebleminded and prone to irrational, violent behavior, which for African 
women was explained on bio-cultural grounds (Chisholm, 1991). 
Explanations for violent crimes were often linked to female bodily 
functions, such as menopause, post-natal depression, or general female 
mental instability and weakness. White judges were seldom able to clearly 
establish the motives of African murderers. Partly this was a consequence of 
cultural incomprehension, and partly due to the accused maneuvering to 
avoid conviction. Although often awed and confused by court surroundings 
and legal proceedings, female accused were not simply passive recipients of 
the judicial “chivalry of mercy,” but active agents capable of using 
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courtroom demeanor together with specific explanations and 
rationalizations of their violence as legally-aware strategies to gain leniency.  
Perhaps it can also be suggested that colonial judges, recognizing the 
frequency of violence against women and their subordinate status but 
unable to do much about it, were more willing to be lenient in sentencing. 
Where women were executed in colonial Africa it was due to the perceived 
“excessive” violence of their acts, premeditation, or acting for personal gain. 
Colonial judges were separated from African women less by the racial 
divide than by gender considerations, but their sentencing was also 
determined in general by their often negative views of capital punishment 
itself. But whilst colonial judges did not see African women’s violence as 
being a significant threat to the social order, and were thus inclined towards 
benevolent paternalism in their dealings with such murderesses, African 
assessors perceived these women’s actions as a dangerous inversion of 
social hierarchy and established patriarchies, particularly at a time of rapid 
and widespread change in socio-economic and gender relations. Their 
representations of violent females thus demonized such women and 
declared them unnatural and not “womanly.” 
 
Speak for Yourself: Violent Female Offenders on Violent Female 
Offenders 
Feminist criminology has frequently highlighted the importance of 
traditional gender-role stereotypes in influencing the treatment of female 
offenders in male-dominated criminal justice systems. Defendants whose 
background character and courtroom demeanor conform to male judicial 
stereotypes of appropriate female gender roles are seen to have benefited 
from a wider application of mercy from male judges (Rapaport, 1991). 
Although these were secondary considerations behind the legal merits of an 
individual case, it seems true that such considerations did influence 
sentencing, particularly in mercy recommendations for women convicted of 
murder. Tapiwa Zimudzi convincingly argues that in Southern Rhodesia 
violent African female offenders were not intimidated by colonial courts, 
but used courtroom demeanor consciously together with specific 
explanations and rationalizations of their violence as legally-aware 
strategies aimed at gaining favorable treatment from colonial judges. 
Highlighting the agency and legal consciousness of these women in the 
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High Court, Zimudzi shows that they were active participants with the 
ability to engage with the power and procedures of colonial justice in their 
own interests. Some women were credited to have “at all times displayed an 
intelligent interest in the proceedings” and been “eager in her cross 
examination of some of the witnesses to be establish the fact that she had 
been ill-treated by her husband and his relations” (Zimudzi, 2004: 505-7). 
 Whilst this is certainly true of some cases, in others, especially where 
the defendant was young or very old, unrepresented by counsel, and 
listening uncomprehendingly to the proceedings in English, it would be 
surprising if they did not feel themselves at a disadvantage. Certainly this 
would account for the unwillingness of some female defendants to give 
their version of events, or to cross-examine witnesses. Perhaps it was more 
important for women to be seen in court than heard, as Zimudzi suggests. 
African women were there “expected to convey the qualities of gentleness, 
quietness, modesty and good motherhood” (Zimudzi, 2004: 507). Discourses 
of sexuality, domesticity, and respectability are crucial to the regulation of 
women’s behavior. Falling short of such gender role expectations, through a 
series of complex social and legal processes, could leave a women becoming 
subject to cultural and judicial misogyny. It was not that these women were 
“defeminized,” as Western studies of women and the death penalty have 
suggested, but that they are associated with more dangerous feminine traits 
(McClintock, 1995). The colonial state built its discourses of violent female 
criminality around the assumed dangerousness of certain types of 
femininity and more generally around assumptions about the potential 
effects of femininity on the public order of things, where the public and 
private spheres overlapped (Heberle, 2001: 49). That colonial concepts of 
“African womanhood” and the positions of women themselves were 
multiple and fluid only rendered courtroom interpretations of such 
discourses more unpredictable, and liable to manipulation by lawyers and 
the accused.  
It is noticeable that the majority of women convicted of murder in 
Kenya and Nyasaland, and indeed in other parts of Africa, viewed their 
violence as rational and justifiable in the circumstances. Many gave 
straightforward explanations for their actions: “I killed him because he 
refused to get me medicine” or “I killed my husband in self-defense. We 
had quarreled and he picked up a panga and threatened to kill me. I got 
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very frightened, so I seized hold of an axe and struck him several times.”3 In 
some cases, women openly asserted their conformity to gender stereotypes 
and pleaded that their position as “proper women” meant they could not be 
responsible for the crimes of which they stood accused. Ndau d/o Wamboti, 
accused of murdering a man Katana in Kenya, 1946 after he broke her pots 
and cursed her family, asserted “It is not usual for a woman to be caught 
fighting with a man” and “Being a woman I could not have left my hut [...] 
to look for a man who had been fighting with my husband.” Rather, she 
stressed, she had been pursuing such typically female duties as feeding her 
children and tending her goats.4 In fact, it was when women’s status as 
“female” was challenged that they tended to resort to violence, as when 
Akamala w/o Mwirikha claimed as provocation for killing her husband the 
fact that he called her “a man” during a quarrel, or with Tapchelong w/o 
Buyot who killed her co-wife’s son after he taunted her with being barren 
and “not a real wife.”5 
Whilst few women pleaded “not guilty,” some chose to deny 
responsibility for their actions, claiming they had been acting under 
provocation, like Wacheke d/o Githinji who murdered her husband in 
Kenya, 1940 but petitioned for mercy as “I had been beaten by the deceased 
and was not responsible for my actions at the time of the crime.”6 Some 
women stressed that native custom allowed the killings they had 
committed. Mukambe d/o Saburi was released by the Governor after being 
convicted of hiring three men to kill her son who had raped her. A 
combination of sympathy for her plight, and administrative confirmation 
that Duruma custom allowed such action determined her early release.7  
Other women such as Kerubo w/o Ayienda, presented themselves as 
willing supplicants to colonial mercy, confessing their crimes, co-operating 
in court, and pleading “I have nothing to say, I ask you to forgive me or to 
hang me, as you feel,” whilst some chose to garner the court's and 
Governor's sympathies by stressing their position as mothers: who would 
                                                 
3  Gando d/o Kithongo, CC85/45, MLA/1/223; Kabon w/o Kirop CC66/46, MLA/1/248, 
Kenyan National Archives, Nairobi [hereafter KNA]. 
4 Kiman s/o Ngutu & Ndau w/o Wamboti C195/46, MLA/1/270, KNA.  
5  Akamala w/o Mwirikha CC162/43, MLA/1/182; Tapchelong w/o Buyot, CC292/52, 
MLA/1/458, KNA. 
6 Wacheke d/o Githinji, CC99/40, MLA/1/55, KNA.  
7 Mukuko s/o Chembeyo + others, MLA/1/201, KNA. .  
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look after their children when they were gone? 8  The multiplicity of 
strategies employed by women belies the argument that they were devoid 
of agency in criminal courts. 
 
Striking Back or Striking Out? : Spousal and Domestic Murders 
Spousal murder by women in Kenya and Nyasaland was a relatively rare 
event, although it is probable that a larger number of non-lethal assaults did 
occur, and that many cases simply did not make it to court. Such murders 
were occasioned predominantly in response to male violence and abuse. 
African women were often seriously assaulted by their husbands or lovers 
for alleged infidelity, disrespect, quarrelling, refusal to have sex, neglect of 
children or running away from home. In fact, spousal murders – 
predominantly men murdering their wives or mistresses - were broadly the 
most common category of murders in Nyasaland between 1900-47 and 
thirty eight per cent of murders with an attributed motive resulted from 
sexually motivated or domestic quarrels involving women. The gender 
violence perpetrated on and by African women was fundamentally rooted 
in their subordinate socio-economic status and cultural norms which 
validated physical violence (Green, 1999).  
Writing on the Gisu in Uganda, La Fontaine states, “it seems like the 
marital relationship is more prone than any other to drive women to 
murder” (La Fontaine, 1960: 105). This could be the case either where a 
husband’s violence drove a woman to react violently, or where she did so in 
response to an external threat, perceived or otherwise, as with adultery or 
rivalry between wives in polygamous marriages. Wife-beating in colonial 
societies was normative and institutionalized to the level of “reasonable 
chastisement,” which often simply meant that the wife did not require 
hospital treatment (Zimudzi, 2004: 505; Mushanga, 1978: 484; Rude, 1999). 
Women accused of murdering their husbands were often perceived as 
reacting to aggression on their husband’s part, but their reciprocal 
aggression was rarely viewed as being reasonable by African or colonial 
judges. African assessors were often less sympathetic towards female 
victims of domestic violence than colonial judges, and frequently stated that 
in cases of domestic abuse the victims should properly have reported the 
                                                 
8 Kerubo w/o Ayienda, CC176/51, MLA/1/431; Wacheke d/o Githinji, CC99/40, MLA/1/55; 
Sangano w/o Kinsop, CC216/49, MLA/1/347, KNA. 
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abuse to their headman, or in the areas of Nyasaland where the system 
operated, they should have visited their ankhoswe (marriage guarantors) for 
arbitration.9  
When Chengwani was convicted of murdering her husband Glasiano 
on 13 June 1930 in Nyasaland, Chief Justice Reed stated in his judgment, 
“The accused is a raw native woman of a low standard of intelligence and if 
she had not confessed she could not have been convicted of the crime. It is 
also very unusual to hang a female.”10 The combination of perceived low 
intelligence and a confession, with Chengwani choosing to co-operate with 
the colonial legal system and appearing to put herself at its disposal, 
encouraged its benevolent paternalism. This was despite the fact that 
Chegwani had earlier openly contested colonial conceptions of women as 
weak and subordinate by repeatedly changing her story about the murder. 
First she told her brother-in-law that she had found Glasiano murdered on 
her return from grinding millet. Then on the 25 June she claimed Gostino 
had murdered Glasiano in a quarrel. Two days later she was asserting that 
she and Gostino had been having an adulterous relationship for two years, 
and Gostino had killed her husband so he could marry her. However, by the 
time of her trial, Chengwani admitted murdering her husband after a 
quarrel. Glasiano had been a sick man who could not work or provide for 
her. They had quarreled over her having to go around dressed in rags. 
Chengwani stated that Gostino had become angry, hit her over the head, 
and threatened to kill her with a knife. She rationalized her actions by 
claiming she acted in self-defense, seizing an axe, and knocking Glasiano on 
the head, unintentionally killing him. However, neither the assessors nor 
Judge Reed believed she had acted in self-defense or received serious 
provocation. Principal Headman Makata commented: 
 
She had no right when her husband was down and the knife 
out of his hand to hit him with the axe. If after her nagging, the 
husband had hit her with the axe it would have been all right, 
but not for her to hit him. I do not think she attacked in self-
defense, nor do I think any ordinary woman would have lost 
her self-control and hit her husband with an axe.11 
                                                 
9 R v Levi Khumba CC13/34 and R v Nyamula, S/106/35, NAM.  
10 R v Chengwani, CC14/31, J5/5/35, NAM. 
11 Ibid.  
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Even the European assessor, Mr H. George, asserted “If it was only the 
common event of a husband threatening to cut her throat, she would have 
run out and called her mother.” This clear chauvinism led Judge Reed to 
comment that “this looks like a man-made law administered by men,” but 
he still could not find self-defense. 12  Chengwani’s lying and apparent 
materialism contradicted her supposed low intelligence and feminine 
submissiveness. In the end, Reed recommended mercy, mainly on the 
grounds of her sex, and Chengwani was sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment – a heavy sentence for a woman in Nyasaland.13  
Colonial law generally viewed unpremeditated killings leniently, and 
it was rare for a woman to be charged with planning a murder. But murders 
resulting from assault with a lethal weapon – such as an axe, spear or knife 
– were liable to be punished more harshly, and women’s general physical 
weakness relative to men meant that many women resorted to using such 
instruments in attack or self-defense, as revealed in their trials. The line 
between self-defense and revenge murder was narrow and fluid, but legally 
crucial. Akamala w/o Mwirikha had her death sentence for murdering her 
husband commuted to seven years imprisonment in Kenya, 1943. Although 
the court accepted that Akamala had been beaten by her husband, the 
savagery of her attack, with eleven blows to Mwirikha's skull using a stick, 
caused one assessor to comment “Even before white rule, people did not kill 
each other in this brutal manner.” Judge Lucie-Smith made “no 
recommendation, except that the accused is a woman.”14 It is interesting that 
in the majority of cases involving female killers where details of the 
murders are known, the violence was directed at the victims head and neck, 
which is suggestive that these were not random, impulsive killings 
committed as a result of a sudden quarrel as frequently occurred in 
incidences of intra-male violence, but were rather specific acts directed at 
the person who somehow threatened them. Women tended to utilize 
weapons close to hand in their killings. Knives and pangas were the most 
frequent weapon employed in both Kenya and Nyasaland, followed by 
sticks or wood, axes, stones, hut burning, and death through beating or 
strangulation.15  
                                                 
12 Ibid.   
13 R v Chengwani, S1/1135/31, NAM. 
14 Akamala w/o Mwirikha, CC162/43, MLA/1/182, KNA.  
15 See Tabule d/o Kipkiget w/o Kipruot arap Soi, CC212/47, MLA/1/281;Mbeneka w/o 
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Spousal murders by African women appear to have been more 
common in Kenya than in Nyasaland, and it is likely that this is a reflection 
of greater gender tensions and female assertiveness there, particularly by 
the 1930s (see Kanogo, 2005). One problem which emerged was cases where 
beaten wives who could stand the abuse no longer or feared for their lives 
waited until their husbands retired for the night and then killed them in 
their sleep. From a legal viewpoint, the time elapsed between any direct 
abuse suffered by the wife and the murder meant that the defense of “grave 
and sudden provocation” could not be found. Realistically however, judges 
were aware that most women lacked the physical strength necessary to 
retaliate immediately to a violent attack, and sympathized with the plight of 
such women. 16  In one case, Sangano w/o Kimosop was convicted of 
murdering her husband by dealing him five blows to the head with an axe 
in his sleep. During the trial it emerged that Kimosop had mistreated her, 
neglected her children, and forced her to have sex with him at knifepoint on 
the night of the murder. Despite protests from local chiefs in Tambach that 
she should be “severely punished to uphold the position of the husband 
according to local custom,” Sangano was sentenced to only five years 
imprisonment.17 It was physical ill-treatment and the failure to provide for 
them and their children that most frequently drove women to homicidal 
violence, particularly in times and regions where famine conditions 
prevailed.  
Children were also victims of female violence, usually killed as a result 
of tensions with family or kin groups. Female reactions to patriarchy are 
complex, and sometimes violence is a result of accommodation with 
patriarchal ideals. Women tend to kill precisely the people and parts of the 
social institutions which define - or threaten - their primary roles as wives 
and mothers, and give them their identities (Brownstein et al., 1994: 110). 
Conflict between women themselves, particularly trouble between co-wives, 
could result in the killing of a child.18 Tapchelong w/o Buyot was a Kipsigis 
woman convicted of the murder of the seven-year-old son of her co-wife 
                                                                                                                                                    
Ndonye, C151/55, MLA/1/1301; Chebor w/o Arap Kesu, CC38/56, MLA/1/1352, KNA.  
16  Wacheke d/o Githinji, CC99/40, MLA/1/55; Nyakihinyo w/o Wiathenyi, CC209/49, 
MLA/1/350, KNA.  
17 Sangano w/o Kinsop, CC216/49, MLA/1/347, KNA.  
18  Tungo d/o Chebili, 1944, MLA/1/213; Kerubo w/o Ayienda, CC176/51, MLA/1/431, 
KNA. 
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Tapsabe in Kenya, 1953. She petitioned for mercy as “The crime I committed 
was I agree one of great wickedness, but I had been provoked by my 
husband and his other wife to such an extent that I was not in my right 
mind when I did this thing.” Tapchelong made a statement to the 
Magistrate in Kericho that: 
  
Tapsabe is always abusing me and insulting me. She does this 
every day. She has no excuse for doing this. My first born died 
a few days after birth, then I had a miscarriage. When I was 
pregnant with the child I now have with me Tapsabe came to 
me one day and threw mud at me saying “The child you carry 
will also die.” She went to my mother and demanded that my 
brideprice should be returned as she now alleged that I was 
barren. She said many dreadful things about me. I resolved 
therefore to kill Tapsabe's child. 
 
In court she attested that in pushing the boy into a waterhole and leaving 
him to drown “I had nothing against the child. I pushed him in to punish 
his mother [...]. I did not care whether he drowned or not.”19 Tapchelong 
avoided the gallows for her crime; other women were not so fortunate.  
 
Life for a Life: Aiba and Margerina  
The sole woman to be executed in Nyasaland, according to the existing 
court records, was Aiba. That she aided her husband in the murder of a 
young girl was not a crime of exceptional violence that would not ordinarily 
have warranted execution. What sent Aiba to the gallows was the fact that 
she participated in the cannibalism of the girl’s corpse. More than any other 
practice, cannibalism was deemed the most “repugnant” by colonial 
officers. The case of Aiba and Ntokoma, her fifty year old husband, in 1926 
was the first time that administrators in Nyasaland were alerted to a murder 
committed for the purpose of procuring flesh for consumption as fears of 
cannibalism spread with the growing famine in Shire Valley.20 Throughout 
the trial Aiba remained quiet but co-operative, displaying a “feminine 
submissiveness” that she perhaps hoped would detract from the court’s 
                                                 
19 Tapchelong w/o Buyot, CC292/52, MLA/1/458, KNA. 
20 R v Njali alias Ntokoma and Aiba, CC16/25, S1/384/26, NAM. The use of @ is unclear 
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horror of her actions. The assessors found both accused guilty of murder, 
but Acting Chief Justice Petrides noted his one difficulty with the case was 
the degree of Aida’s complicity; “There was no evidence that she was 
present at the murder, but there was enough I considered to establish her 
prior abetment, so that as an accessory to murder she rendered herself liable 
to the capital penalty.” He regarded the accused as “both an extremely low 
and degraded looking type and must have grown to maturity before they 
had any contact with ideas other than those of savagery,” and who further 
shocked colonial sentiment by offering up another child as compensation. 
Considering the heinousness of the crime and the chance that cannibalism 
during famine might encourage further murders, Judge Petrides sentenced 
Aiba and her husband to death, without recommendation to mercy. 
Governor Bowring confirmed the death sentence, and Aiba was sent to her 
death on 26 January 1927.21  
Coincidentally, the last woman to be executed in Kenya also went to 
her death in 1927. Margerina wa Kori was a Gikuyu woman convicted of the 
murder of another woman, Eliza, at the Italian mission in Fort Hall on 
Tuesday, 1 February. It was found that Margerina and Eliza were neighbors 
who had been quarrelling for some months. The two were walking home 
from an evening prayer meeting, Eliza carrying a child and holding a lamp 
aloft, when Margerina drew a knife she had concealed beneath her cloak 
and started a fight. The two women struggled until another woman called 
for Eliza to let Margerina get up off the ground. As Eliza stood, Margerina 
stabbed her in the heart. Eliza cried “I am stabbed” and ran towards her 
home, but collapsed before reaching it and died shortly afterwards. 
According to the acting solicitor general, “the case appears to be one of 
deliberate murder by a person who sought out the quarrel and who 
provided herself with a stick and a knife before starting the quarrel.” It was 
the elements of premeditation and determined murder that condemned 
Margerina, particularly when occasioned by a Christian convert shortly 
after prayer. 22  Although her husband claimed she was pregnant in an 
attempt to save her from the gallows, this was found to be untrue, and 
Margerina was hanged.  
                                                 
21 R v Njali alias Ntokoma and Aiba, CC16/25, S/1/384/26, NAM. Same remark 
22  African Christians were held to be more “civilized” than pagans, and were 
consequently held to a higher standard of behaviour. As such, those who committed 
crimes could find themselves being given more severe sentences.  
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Deadly Sisterhood: Intra-female Violence 
Whilst many women suffer from various forms of domestic violence, violent 
crime itself can be a type of women’s resistance against specific oppressive 
gender relations within the family and society. Women can be driven to 
despair by unequal or abusive societal rules and in response kill whomever 
they perceive as the immediate cause of their distress, although the victim 
may be innocent of violating any of the women’s rights (Timutemwa-
Ekirikubinza, 1999: 232-3). In some cases, they were even willing aggressors. 
What best illustrates their inherent capacity for aggressive behavior is that 
African women also killed each other, often in jealous quarrels. The trial of 
Ndinga and Ndame, jointly convicted of beating another woman 
Ngawonelanga to death in Zomba on 14 September 1921, is a case in point. 
Ndinga, a thirty-five-year old Yao, and Ndame, a thirty-seven-year old 
Ngoni woman were both wives of January. Ngawonelanga was a young 
woman whom January had long wanted to marry, but had been dissuaded 
by one of the accused. Witnesses for the Crown stated that Ndinga and 
Ndame were “very jealous of the deceased, and took no pains to conceal 
this.” On the Sunday afternoon of the attack, all attended a beer drinking 
session where “There cannot be much doubt that the accused at least had 
consumed too much beer by the time that the deceased arrived at the hut.” 
January greeted Ngawonelanga, shaking her hand, which infuriated the 
accused who remonstrated with Ngawonelanga for trying to take their 
husband away from them. Sensing a quarrel was imminent January and 
everyone else apart from the hut’s owner, Nchili, left. Nchili stated in court 
that the accused then started to beat the deceased; Ndame using a bamboo 
ulolwe (pestle) from the grain store whilst Ndinga held Ngawonelanga 
down. When the beating was finished, Ngawonelanga crawled out of the 
hut, where she began to vomit blood and later died.  
Ndinga and Ndame both flatly denied in court that they had ever 
quarreled with or assaulted the deceased. Justice Petrides and all the 
assessors determined however that they were guilty of Ngawonelanga’s 
death, although they had not intended to kill her. The assessors 
recommended that the death penalty not be inflicted. Petrides though had 
difficulty in finding a strong justification for this decision; he noted “The 
assault was a brutal one and in ordinary circumstances it would have been 
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difficult to urge much in favor of commutation. The murder occurred 
however [...] nearly nine months ago.” The trial had been delayed after the 
medical officer in Zomba prison suspected that one of the women was 
pregnant and Petrides delayed trial until this could be confirmed.23 A long 
period between charge and final conviction was frequently mooted at this 
time as a reason for mercy, it being judged “inhumane” to execute someone 
after an extended period of stress awaiting sentence.24 Both Ndinga and 
Ndame had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment, not to be 
reviewed before fifteen years had been served, the longest prison sentence 
awarded for a woman in Nyasaland during this period.25  
 
Killing the Witch: Witchcraft Belief and Murder 
Another type of murder committed by women was the killing of suspected 
witches who had threatened the accused's family or person. This type of 
murder conviction appears to have been more common in Kenya than in 
Nyasaland. Typically, the women viewed their actions as entirely necessary 
and rational. In one trial, Awoi d/o Ewokor, a young Turkana woman, had 
her death sentence for the murder of a two-year-old girl commuted to 
eighteen months on the grounds that she genuinely believed its mother had 
caused the death of Awoi's child through witchcraft.26 Awoi's case was 
considered sympathetically by Officer-in-Charge Denis McKay, and 
everyone else involved in her conviction, for Turkana was a region with 
strong cultural beliefs in witchcraft. Awoi had been visiting her father's 
manyatta when her child fell sick. Believing another woman, Rukwalle, to 
be responsible, she asked her to remove the spell. According to Rukwalle, “I 
tried to take the spell off. I don't know if I'd bewitched it or not. People said 
I had [...]. When her child died, she struck my child with a piece of wood 
and killed it.” Rukwalle stated “I want the accused let off - not even cattle 
taken from her.” Assessor Nadyo Lotodo summed up local sentiment in 
stating “Our law and the Government’s are different. There are witches in 
Turkana who can kill stock or people. According to Turkana custom the 
                                                 
23 R v Ndinga and Ndame, 1925, NAM.  
24See Local legislation to obviate the necessity of passing sentence of death, S1/42/22, 
NAM). 
25 R v Ndinga and Ndame, 1925, NAM.  
26 Awoi d/o Ewokor, SDCC9/45, MLA/1/239, KNA. 
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accused has not done wrong. Her child was killed so she killed the child of 
the murderer.” McKay wrote to Nairobi in both his capacity as trial judge 
and prison superintendent, to assert that her conduct in prison was 
“excellent” and that he had passed the death sentence “with strong 
recommendation to mercy” as Awoi was “an unsophisticated Turkana 
woman who has not committed an offence according to tribal law and who 
at the time she committed the crime was overcome with grief at the loss of 
her child.”27 Cultural defenses, stressing native custom and the “state of 
civilization” in an accused's tribe or home area, may not have been a legal 
excuse to murder, but they did have considerable weight in the final 
disposition of a case.  
 
Weak-minded Women and Murdering Mothers: Child-Killing, Insanity, 
and Female Psychology  
As has been outlined above, there was a strong correlation drawn in 
European minds between violent African female criminality and mental 
instability or illness. This was informed both by wider androcentric 
criminological perspectives which located female criminality in women’s 
biological characteristics, and popular “ethnopsychiatric” views that viewed 
Africans as inherently unstable, lacking self-control, and prone to violent 
outbursts and “manias.” Female murderers were frequently reported as 
being of “below average intelligence” or of a primitive mentality. 28 
Although doctors admitted to having a limited understanding of African 
psychology, there was general belief in ethno-psychiatry that normal 
Africans were close in temperament to European psychotics, which 
percolated through legal and administrative circles, particularly in 
understandings of schizophrenia, epilepsy, and “mania” among Africans 
(McKittrick, 1999; McCullock, 1995; Vaughan, 1991: 100-15; Jackson, 2005). 
Racialised and gendered assumptions thus combined to doubly disqualify 
violent African female criminals from rationality, although it would seem 
that ascribed gender characteristics often outweighed racial attributes.  
One area where female actions were particularly seen as resulting from 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Sangano w/o Kinsop, CC216/49, MLA/1/347, KNA.  
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mental abnormality was in child murders.29 Mothers who killed children, 
either their own or those of others, were often seen as suffering 
psychological imbalance or “puerperal mania,” today known as post-natal 
depression. One young woman accused of such a crime, Alikutu of Kota 
Kota district in 1926, was held to have murdered her one week old son, but 
was recommended to mercy by both District Magistrate Murphy, who 
originally tried the case, and Chief Justice Belcher who approved sentence.30 
Murphy, as stated at the beginning of this paper, recommended mercy on 
the grounds that “the female mind is [not] sufficiently developed to justify 
the application of the extreme penalty of the law.” Belcher attributed 
Alikutu’s actions to the “result of child bearing” noting “these murders are 
not uncommon among European women” thus viewing Alikutu’s 
criminality as a result of her gender rather than as a result of African 
“abnormality.” In her defense statement Alikutu admitted that she 
remembered killing her child, but could not say why she had done so, 
leading the court to interpret the killing of her son not as a sign of madness 
but of an “impulse beyond control.” Belcher reported in his judgment that 
“I cannot believe punishment serves any useful purpose in such a case 
which is the result [...] of something having all the effects of insanity though 
falling without the legal definition of that mental state.” He instead 
recommended mercy, with a prison term of one year’s imprisonment and 
medical observation to review her mental state.31 Although there was no 
evidence of Alikutu being insane, colonial justice could not accept the 
killing of her child by a mother as a rational action.  
In the case of Mwose w/o Mwiba, the accused freely admitted she had 
killed her four children and then tried to commit suicide, cutting their 
throats and then slashing her own, during her trial she was able to 
“display[ed] an intelligent interest in the proceedings,” and to give a 
relatively rational explanation of what transpired.32 According to Mwose, 
she had been unfairly accused of theft, beaten by her brother-in-law and 
neglected by her husband in favor of his second wife: “I killed my children 
on account of the distress I was suffering owing to the conditions which 
                                                 
29 See also Tungo d/o Chebili, MLA/213; Estheri Wanjiro w/o Karikui, CC179/49, 
MLA/1/351, KNA.  
30 R v Alikutu, CC9/26, J5/12/23, NAM.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Mwose w/o Mwiba CC239/48, MLA/1/295, KNA 
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were in front of me.” Nevertheless, according to the Machakos Magistrate 
who originally heard her case, “the balance of her mind must have been 
extremely upset when she killed her children and endeavored to do away 
with herself.” Mwose was sent for psychiatric evaluation under Dr J.C. 
Carothers, the “chief alienist” at Mathari Lunatic Asylum. Carothers came 
to the conclusion that whilst she was presently: 
 
…more or less sane [...]. […] her actions on the 2 May were 
typical of the existence of insane depression [...]. In such a 
condition she would not know what she was doing. I think her 
attitude would be quite distorted. I think her attitude would be 
that it would not be fair to leave the children alive because she 
would feel that they would be equally badly treated as herself if 
she took her own life.33 
 
Carothers did however admit that Mwose's attempts to pin the blame for 
the crime on an unknown person upon the discovery of the bodies “might 
indicate that she knew that those actions were wrong.” The assessors all 
agreed with Carothers though that Mwose should be found “guilty but 
insane”; it was hard to accept how a women could kill the children she 
loved otherwise. Judge Modera however, noted that “Whilst I am fully 
appreciative of the weight of the testimony afforded by Dr Carothers” he 
was “not satisfied that it had been proved that the accused at the time she 
killed her daughter was, through disease affecting her mind, incapable of 
understanding the physical nature of the act, or of knowing that she ought 
not to do the act [...]. She was, as she herself admitted, overwrought by her 
surroundings and decided to do away with her family and try to do away 
with herself,”34 This tension between the medical and legal definition of 
insanity had become increasingly problematic in Kenya, with judge’s 
complaining about the poor quality of medical evidence and asserting that 
the final decision on insanity lay with the court, not with doctors.35 Here, 
power struggles between different colonial actors and competing notions of 
expertise pulled the discourses of insanity in different directions, with 
Mwose caught between their webs. Whilst the attempts to determine the 
                                                 
33 Ibid., Carothers’ report.  
34 Ibid., Dr Carothers’ report; Judge Modera’s report.  
35 See Criminal Cases – Procedure in Capital Cases, 1939-43, MLA/1/1368, KNA. 
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accused woman’s mental capabilities could be seen as humane in one sense, 
it simultaneously reinforced state power. Women were in the end judged 
against standards of social behavior which were more gendered and 
medicalized than racialized.  
 
Conclusion 
The worldview of British colonial African administrations was determined 
partially by the African communities over which they ruled. The 
background stories to many of these murders are enmeshed in dominant 
ideologies and social institutions which granted women limited 
responsibility and subordinated them to men. Patriarchal alliances among 
African and colonial authorities combined to punish these women, but in 
doing so blurred the differences between their respective perceptions of 
power, gender, marriage, and motherhood. Women accused of violent 
crimes could be caught in the contradictions and categories created around 
them by these discourses. Violent women were not just “mad” or “bad”; 
their behavior was rooted in their social world, with the patterns of their 
crimes reflecting the changing social conditions of women. The majority of 
their crimes were domestic murders, viewed as marginal to general public 
order and thus subject to lighter sentence. It was only where such crimes 
were interpreted locally as threatening order, where the woman’s violence 
was premeditated or “repugnant” that execution occurred. Violent female 
offenders’ actions must be read within the contradictory and multiple 
cultural logics of colonial rule, but in their final court trial it was a more 
European influenced discourse which prevailed, linking femininity, 
physical weakness, and irrational behavior. These offenders were firstly 
“women” in the eyes of colonial judges, then “African.” At the same time, 
this discourse though was not simply informed by a gendered “chivalry of 
mercy,” but more widely by a racial paternalism and an often liberal 
penalty, reflected in judges frequent antipathies towards the death penalty 
itself. Neither “gender” nor “colonialism” in these discourses were 
monolithic, uncontested ideas.   
Capital trials in colonial courts were sites of both legal and gender 
contestations between the colonial legal system and the female defendants. 
In granting mercy and lenient sentences towards these women, the courts 
both validated and undermined these women and their use of violence. The 
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same colonial logic which spared their lives simultaneously limited their 
social status and independence: in absolving women of full responsibility 
for their actions, the colonial state also denied women’s agency. However, 
African female offenders were not just passive subjects of colonial justice, 
but were active agents who could challenge the court’s perceptions of their 
criminality through denial and creation of alternative histories, or who 
could appropriate and inhabit existing colonial discourses of femaleness, 
which often contrasted with their own perception of appropriate gendered 
behavior. African women were both the victims and perpetrators of violent 
crime; not deadlier than the male, but capable of using and representing 
their violence in their own interests.  
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